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Abstract—The Domain Name System (DNS) provides a critical
service on the Internet: translating host names into IP addresses.
Traditional DNS does not provide guarantees about authenticity
and origin integrity. DNSSEC, an extension to DNS, improves
this by using cryptographic signatures, at the expense of larger
response messages. Some of these larger response messages
experience fragmentation, and may, as a result of that, be blocked
by firewalls. As a consequence, resolvers behind such firewalls
will no longer receive complete responses from name servers,
leading to certain Internet zones becoming unreachable because
no translation into IP addresses can be performed.
Our research shows that despite ongoing efforts to educate
firewall and resolver administrators, as much as 10% of all
resolvers suffer from fragmentation-related connectivity issues.
Given that some major Internet companies were reluctant to
adopt even a technology like IPv6 if it meant that a small
percentage of their users would have connectivity issues, it is
clear that we cannot rely on resolver/firewall operators alone to
tackle this issue.
The contribution of this paper is that it a) quantifies the
severity of these DNSSEC deployment problems, based on exten-
sive measurements at a major National Research and Education
Network (NREN) and backed up by validation of these findings
at an independent second location, b) proposes two potential
solutions at the DNS authoritative name server side, and c)
validates both solutions, again based on extensive measurements
on the operational network of this major NREN. The paper
concludes with a recommendation favoring our first solution.
The first solution is relatively simple to implement and gives
DNS zone operators control over this problem without having to
rely on all resolver operators solving the issue.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE Domain Name System (DNS) provides a criticalservice on the Internet. DNS is responsible for translating
easily recognizable host names into IP addresses.
DNS data is contained in zones, like surfnet.nl, in which
resource records are specified, such as www.surfnet.nl. An
authoritative name server for a zone responds to queries
from resolvers for these records. Resolvers are responsible for
querying authoritative name servers on behalf of end users.
The majority of DNS messages are transmitted using the UDP
protocol, although TCP can be used as a fallback.
Traditional DNS has no mechanism to ensure data origin
integrity and authenticity. This makes it possible to alter
DNS traffic. Multiple vulnerabilities have been identified since
the 1990’s [1], [2], RFC 3833. Such incidents have led to
proposals to secure DNS.
In the secure version of DNS (DNSSEC, RFC 4033-4035),
resource records are digitally signed to provide data origin
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Fig. 1. DNSSEC response messages at SURFnet resolvers (by approxima-
tion).
integrity and authenticity. Resolvers can verify the authenticity
of data received from an authoritative name server based on
these digital signatures.
DNSSEC is implemented in many DNS software distribu-
tions and its use is increasing, as shown in Fig. 1. Since the
DNS root was signed in 2010, the percentage of responses that
could be validated using DNSSEC on resolvers of SURFnet1
has grown to about 10% by mid-2013. More information
on the current deployment state and other DNSSEC related
resources can be found at the Internet Society2.
Traditional DNS specifies a maximum UDP message size
of 512 bytes. That is no longer sufficient for most DNSSEC
responses, because of the added burden of having to include
digital signatures in each response. Cowperthwaite and So-
mayaji [12] measured an increase of 11 times in response size.
An extension mechanism, called EDNS0 (RFC 2671) allows
for larger messages. In some cases, DNSSEC responses are
so large that they are fragmented into multiple IP fragments.
Fragmentation occurs when the message size exceeds the
maximum amount of data (MTU3) that can be transported in
one packet. This poses a problem, however, since fragments
are often blocked by firewalls to prevent some types of cyber
attacks (but at the expense of VPN interoperability, see [3] for
a discussion of the tradeoffs).
Firewalls that block fragments introduce problems as de-
picted in Fig. 2. The resolver sends a query (1) to an authorita-
tive name server. The name server sends back a large response
that exceeds the MTU and is fragmented. The fragments arrive
1The Dutch National Research and Education Network (NREN).
2http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/dnssec
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Fig. 2. DNS resolver incapable of receiving fragmented response messages because of firewall restrictions.
at a fragment blocking firewall, where the first fragment (2)
is allowed to pass, but remaining fragments (3) are blocked.
The resolver is now unable to reassemble the fragments to
get the original response. After some time the resolver will
signal that it did not receive all fragments by sending back an
ICMP Fragment Reassembly Time Exceeded (FRTE) message
(4). The end effect of fragment blocking firewalls is that
complete zones, even the DNS root [4], become unreachable
for resolvers behind such firewalls and consequently to every
client using these resolvers [5]. In the remainder of this paper
we will refer to such resolvers as problematic resolvers.
One might consider using signature algorithms that result
in smaller signatures, or propose the development of a mech-
anism for cipher-suite negotiation [13]. This may result in
smaller responses and hence less fragmentation. However, it
is questionable if this would solve the problem.
The obvious approach for now is to solve this problem at the
problematic resolver’s side. Educational materials like4 explain
this issue in detail. Besides configuring firewalls correctly, a
solution could be that problematic resolvers switch to TCP,
instead of UDP, in order to avoid fragmentation. TCP, however,
is expensive compared to UDP in terms of response time and
system resource consumption. Another solution would be to
detect problems with fragmentation at the problematic resolver
side, for example by inspecting the maximum MTU from the
authoritative name server, and alter future requests to avoid
fragmentation [6], [7]. To a certain extent, modern name server
software will use this strategy.
The problem with relying on resolver operators, however,
to deal with this issue is two-fold. Firstly, it gives very little
control to DNS zone operators whose zones may become un-
reachable for end users behind problematic resolvers. This may
hinder wide-scale deployment of DNSSEC, as parallels with
IPv6 show, where large companies were reluctant to deploy
IPv6 because it potentially meant that a small percentage of
their users would experience connectivity issues. Secondly,
resolver operators may be unaware that they suffer from
this problem. The majority of DNS resolver implementations
request DNSSEC data regardless of whether or not that data
is validated and have default settings that inevitably lead to
fragmented responses to some of their queries.
Potential problems associated with deploying DNSSEC
have already been described in literature [8]; the novel contri-
bution of this paper is that it:
4http://www.surfnet.nl/Documents/rapport Deploying DNSSEC v20.pdf
a) quantifies the severity of this problem for operators, based
on extensive measurements on the live infrastructure at a
major NREN;
b) proposes two potential solutions to avoid fragmentation at
the authoritative name server side;
c) validates both solutions, again based on extensive measure-
ments on the operational network of this major NREN.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II analyzes the
extent of the problem, based on real-world measurements,
and validates findings at a second location. After the severity
of the problem is known, two solutions for an authoritative
name server to avoid response fragmentation are proposed.
Section III discusses a solution that avoids response fragmen-
tation in general, for all resolvers. Section IV discusses a more
sophisticated solution, which detects problematic resolvers and
modifies responses for those resolvers only. Section V com-
pares both solutions, and Section VI contains our conclusions.
II. EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM
This section presents real-world observations of the problem
with fragmented responses. These observations result from
network traces recorded on an authoritative name server of
SURFnet. This server is authoritative for ±4000 zones, includ-
ing ±300 DNSSEC-signed zones. It receives ±500 queries per
second on average.
The traces recorded in early 2012 over a period of 6
hours contain about 8.5 million DNS(SEC) messages. In these
traces we identified 231,391 unique resolvers (based on IP
addresses). ±75% of all queries used EDNS0, indicating that
the querying resolver is capable of receiving responses with
EDNS0. The average response size (UDP and IP headers not
included) is 840 bytes. Note that this is higher than the limit
for traditional DNS messages (512 bytes). The cumulative
distribution of the response size is shown in Fig. 3. About
36% of all responses are fragmented at the authoritative name
server (with an MTU of 1232 bytes). Moreover, 57% of all
resolvers received a fragmented response at some time during
the measurements.
In the following we identify and discuss 5 behavioral
patterns indicating that we are dealing with a problematic
resolver. We note that only the first pattern is a definite
indicator that the resolver has problems with fragments. Be-
cause this pattern may be affected by the firewall that causes
the problems for the resolver we have also looked at 4
heuristic indicators for problematic resolvers. The patterns are
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Fig. 3. CDF of DNS response size in traces.
Problematic Resolver Characteristic Occurrence
CASE 1: Send ICMP Fragment Reassembly Time Exceeded 1.3%
CASE 2: Fallback to traditional DNS 2.4%
CASE 3: Reduce advertised max. response size in retries 3.5%
CASE 4: TCP fallback w/o truncated UDP response <0.1%
CASE 5: Retries for large responses (>512 bytes) 9.7%
TABLE I
PROBLEMATIC RESOLVER CHARACTERISTICS.
summarized in Tab. I together with their occurrence in the
recorded traces.
CASE 1 The simplest pattern to detect is receiving ICMP
Fragment Reassembly Time Exceeded (FRTE) messages at the
authoritative name server, as discussed in Sec. I. These ICMP
messages confirm that the resolver experiences problems with
fragmented responses. 1.3% of the resolvers seen in the traces
exhibit this behavior. Note that, as mentioned above, the
firewall affecting a problematic resolver may also block ICMP
messages sent back to an authoritative name server for security
reasons, as discussed in [3].
CASE 2 Some DNS software will, when not receiving a
response to a query that uses EDNS0, retry a query using tra-
ditional DNS (probably under the assumption that the authori-
tative name server being queried does not support EDNS0). A
resolver cannot distinguish not receiving a response because
of blocked fragments from not receiving an answer because
EDNS0 is not supported. We therefore expect resolvers that
use this strategy to apply it in the problem under consideration.
In the traces, we detected this behavior in 2.4% of all resolvers.
CASE 3 When using EDNS0, resolvers advertise the max-
imum response size they support in all queries. These adver-
tisements are used by authoritative name servers to ensure that
responses do not exceed this size limit. Consequently, if the
advertised maximum response size exceeds the MTU of the
link between the resolver and the authoritative name server,
this will lead to fragmentation. Our traces show that 69% of
all queries contain a maximum response size advertisement set
to the default5 value of 4096 bytes. Considering that the MTU
is mostly ≤1500 bytes, advertising a maximum response size
of 4096 bytes likely results in fragmented responses.
Some resolver software dynamically adapts the advertised
5That is: the default for the most popular name server software.
maximum response size if it fails to receive responses to
queries. Thus, if we detect this behavior, this is indicative of
a problematic resolver. Our traces show 3.5% of all resolvers
applying this strategy.
Interestingly, our traces also show that 1.8% of all queries
used EDNS0 with a maximum response size advertisement of
just 512 bytes and that 2% of all queries have a maximum
response size advertisement between 1280 and 1472 bytes.
This range is likely chosen by resolver operators such that
most responses do not get fragmented, since it is below the
MTU of Ethernet6.
CASE 4 If an answer does not fit in the maximum response
size advertised by a resolver, the authoritative name server will
send back a truncated response, indicating to the resolver that
the response is incomplete. In order to avoid response size
restrictions for UDP, DNS then allows the resolver to retry
the query using TCP. Some 0.1% of all resolvers, however,
use TCP after a UDP response that is not truncated. We
have strong suspicions that these are problematic resolvers
attempting to avoid fragmentation issues.
CASE 5 Finally, there are resolvers (9.7% of all resolvers)
for which we only detect series of retries that always result
in responses larger than 512 bytes. Since we only see retries,
it becomes difficult to determine which of these resolvers are
actually problematic resolvers. We will discuss this problem
in more detail in Sec. IV.
Weaver et al. [7] state that up to 9% of all Internet hosts
may have problems receiving fragmented UDP messages. Our
measurements confirm this; traces show that most resolvers
receive fragmented responses and we identified 5 different
resolver behaviors that can indicate problems receiving frag-
mented responses. As much as 10.5% of all resolvers showed
one or more of these behaviors. We verified our results using
traces from an authoritative name server at the University of
Pennsylvania, which showed the same distribution of behav-
ioral patterns indicative of problematic resolvers.
III. AVOIDING RESPONSE FRAGMENTATION IN GENERAL
This section presents a simple solution to the problem by
attempting to avoid most response fragmentation in general.
This involves changes to authoritative name servers, as shown
in Fig. 4.
As mentioned in Section II (CASE 3), resolvers advertise
a maximum response size in EDNS0 queries. Problematic
resolvers advertise maximum response sizes that are too high
(as they cannot receive fragmented responses). Generally
speaking, the response size on an authoritative name server
is only limited by the size advertised by querying resolvers
and not by configuration settings on the authoritative name
server itself.
The solution we propose here is to restrict the maximum
response size in the configuration of the authoritative name
server, such that (most) response fragmentation is avoided.
678% of all paths between any 2 nodes on the Internet have the Ethernet
MTU (1500 bytes) and 96% are ≤1500 bytes [7]. The maximum size for DNS
responses (without IP and UDP headers) that avoids fragmentation, given an
MTU of 1500 bytes, is 1472 bytes for IPv4 and 1452 bytes for IPv6.
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Fig. 4. Authoritative name server with limited response size.
When responding to queries the authoritative name server will
then use the minimum of the configured response size and that
advertised in the query.
The response size limit for the authoritative name server
should be as high as possible, while avoiding most frag-
mentation. If the limit is chosen too low, this may result in
undesirably high levels of truncated responses, resulting in
retries over TCP. Considering that the MTU is usually 1500
bytes6, the limit should be below that value. We propose to use
a limit of 1232 bytes, based on the minimum MTU for IPv6 of
1280 bytes (RFC 2460). This ensures that any response sent
over IPv6 by the authoritative name server is not fragmented.
The minimum IPv4 MTU is 68 bytes (RFC 791), which is too
small to be used here, but since 1232 bytes is well below the
expected MTU of 1500 bytes we expect this limit to avoid
fragmentation for IPv4 as well. Note that other limits are
possible and that 1232 bytes may be too small for some zones
[9]. This limit can be set in most DNS software using a single
parameter.
The response size limit will help most problematic resolvers,
even if just one of the authoritative name servers per zone
returns responses of limited size. This is because resolvers
query all authoritative name servers for a zone in case they do
not receive a response.
The solution presented in this section avoids most response
fragmentation thus helping problematic resolvers. Although
this solution is very simple, care must be taken that a proper
size limit is chosen.
IV. SELECTIVELY AVOIDING RESPONSE FRAGMENTATION
This section presents a solution that avoids response frag-
mentation by limiting the response size for problematic re-
solvers only. Fig. 5 shows the setup of this solution. This
solution is based on DNSRM7 (DNS Router/Modifier), a tool
we developed specifically for this purpose. DNSRM operates
as a host-proxy on an authoritative name server and acts on
information supplied by a separate sensor tool that detects
problematic resolvers.
A. Modifying queries using DNSRM
The purpose of DNSRM is to allow an authoritative name
server to differentiate in response size, depending on the
7https://svn.surfnet.nl/svn/dnstools/
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Fig. 5. Authoritative name server with a host-proxy (DNSRM) and an
external sensor.
querying resolver.
DNSRM achieves this goal by acting as a host-proxy be-
tween the local authoritative name server process (e.g. BIND)
and the outside world. It is transparent for resolvers in the
outside world. DNSRM also forwards a copy of all DNS
traffic to a sensor, which is tasked with detecting problematic
resolvers and their maximum response size. DNSRM receives
updates to a list of IP addresses of detected problematic
resolvers from the sensor.
Finally, DNSRM modifies queries from problematic re-
solvers detected by the sensor, before it passes them on to the
local authoritative name server process. DNSRM overwrites
the advertised maximum response size in a query. It does so
when a query from a problematic resolver has a maximum
response size advertisement larger than the maximum response
size for that problematic resolver detected by the sensor.
DNSRM does not modify responses.
B. Detecting problematic resolvers using a sensor
A sensor detects problematic resolvers based on DNS
traffic forwarded by DNSRM. The sensor analyses the traffic
per resolver, based on the 5 problematic resolver behaviors
discussed in Sec. II. The sensor uses a system of thresholds
when detecting a problematic resolver, in order to avoid false
positives. For instance, network issues causing packet drops
may result in resolver behavior that could incorrectly suggest
a problematic resolver. The actual values of the thresholds
depend on the network characteristics of the authoritative name
server running DNSRM8. The sensor works as follows for each
problematic resolver behavior pattern:
CASE 1 The sensor detects ICMP Fragment Reassembly Time
Exceeded messages; resolvers sending ICMP FRTE
messages are marked as problematic.
CASE 2 The sensor analyses retries of queries. If a resolver
changes from EDNS0 to traditional DNS for the same
query in a retry, it is marked as problematic.
CASE 3 A resolver that reduces its advertised maximum
response size in retries, will also be marked as a
problematic resolver.
8We used an expected packet loss of 4% for responses sent to a resolver,
based on Wang et al. [10].
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CASE 4 The sensor detects the use of TCP in retries. As
mentioned in Sec. II this is only allowed when a
truncated UDP response precedes the fallback to
TCP (RFC 1123). Resolvers that use TCP without
a preceding truncated UDP response are marked as
problematic.
CASE 5 There are a number of resolvers that do not show
any of the behaviors described above, but do send
sequences of similar queries that appear to be retries.
Since we only see these retries, it is difficult to de-
termine if these resolvers are problematic resolvers.
Some will be non-caching resolvers, that do not
store a response and therefore frequently send the
same query. Non-caching resolvers are not necessar-
ily problematic resolvers. If the number of ’retries’
from a resolver after responses ≤512 bytes exceeds
a pre-set threshold we consider them to be non-
caching. Here, we assume that fragmentation issues
do not affect responses ≤512 bytes. If we see retries
from a resolver that is not considered a non-caching
resolver, then it will be marked as problematic if the
number of retries after responses >512 bytes exceeds
a pre-set threshold.
The sensor not only detects problematic resolvers but also
the maximum response size it supports. This is done by
marking the lowest response size for which problematic re-
solver behavior still occurs. The maximum response size for a
problematic resolver is reduced stepwise, starting at the MTU
of the medium (e.g. Ethernet6) being used by the authoritative
name server running DNSRM. The process continues for as
long as problematic resolver behavior is detected9 and will
help a problematic resolver quicker with a larger step size.
The solution presented in this section avoids response
fragmentation, but only for problematic resolvers detected
by a sensor. The sensor detects a maximum response size
per problematic resolver that avoids response fragmentation.
The size of a response from an authoritative name server is
reduced by overwriting the advertised maximum response size
in queries using DNSRM. This solution leaves the settings of
a problematic resolver unchanged.
V. EVALUATION
This section evaluates the two solutions that were presented
in Sections III and IV. First, the characteristics of the solutions
are compared. Next, the results of real-world testing are
discussed.
A. Comparing characteristics
The first solution avoids response fragmentation by limiting
the size of all responses sent by an authoritative name server
by altering a single parameter on the server. The advantage
of this approach is that it is trivial to implement. The biggest
disadvantage, however, is that it is a blanket approach that
affects all resolvers. As a consequence, well-behaved resolvers
(±90% of all resolvers) may suffer performance penalties
9It will never go below 512 bytes since that is the lower limit for EDNS0.
because they do not receive optimal answers to their queries.
Additionally, problematic resolvers are not given an incentive
to alter their configuration. Thus one could claim that this
approach rewards bad behavior. Finally, this solution does not
address all issues of problematic resolvers (e.g. blocking DNS
messages ≥512 bytes).
The second solution only avoids response fragmentation
for problematic resolvers. Its main advantage is that it is
adaptive; it only limits the response size for resolvers that
are suspected to be problematic. Also, it limits the response
size dynamically. Thus, unlike the first solution, it also helps
problematic resolvers that suffer additional constraints on the
path between themselves and the authoritative name server.
A final advantage of this solution is that it only assists
problematic resolvers for a limited amount of time, giving ad-
ministrators of these hosts a bigger incentive to improve their
behavior. What makes this solution less attractive, especially
in a production environment, is its complexity. It requires two
additional components, a host-proxy directly in the path to
the authoritative name server and a sensor application that is
CPU intensive. If, however, the decision is made to deploy the
second solution, then it is imperative that the system(s) hosting
the DNSRM and the sensor application be properly sized and
engineered such that the second solution deployment is not
a bottleneck, i.e., that the effective throughput of the name
server is not decreased.
B. Real-world testing
Both solutions were tested for 6.5 hours during office hours
on the same authoritative name server of SURFnet that was
used to measure the extent of the problem (Sec. II). Network
traces were recorded during the tests for later analysis.
1) Avoiding response fragmentation in general: To test the
first solution we reduced the response size from a typical
4096 bytes to 1232 bytes. Traces show that no responses were
fragmented at the authoritative name server. Consequently,
we saw no ICMP FRTE messages, which indicates that this
solution effectively helped the hosts that were previously
sending these error messages. We saw a slight increase in the
number of truncated UDP responses, but the increase was not
statistically significant.
2) Selectively avoiding response fragmentation: The sec-
ond solution was tested with DNSRM on the same server
and a separate sensor. Traces show that fragmentation was
down about 50% compared to normal operations; note that
fragmented responses still occur for resolvers that are not
marked as problematic resolvers.
The number of ICMP FRTE messages was 18% of normal.
This number is not zero, because the sensor first needs to
detect a problematic resolver. Only after detection will the
resolver be helped and will these ICMP messages disappear.
The number of truncated UDP responses almost doubled
in this experiment. This suggests that the detected maximum
response size for some problematic resolvers may have been
too small. Analysis of the detected sizes confirms this. Ap-
proximately 18% of all problematic resolvers were assigned
a maximum response size of 512 bytes, likely resulting in
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truncated UDP responses. Most of these problematic resolvers
may actually be non-caching resolvers, that have no problem
receiving fragmented responses. Our mechanism for detecting
non-caching resolvers may therefore need improving.
Our evaluation suggests that the first solution we proposed
is preferred in production environments due to its simplicity
and effectiveness. If just one of the authoritative name servers
for a zone limits its response size to a value that avoids
most response fragmentation, then problematic resolvers may
already be able to receive responses. Depending on the zone,
a proper response size limit needs to be chosen, in order to
avoid an unacceptable increase in truncated UDP responses
and TCP fallbacks [9]. We believe that our second solution is
not without merit, however. Implementing it yielded a useful
categorization of the problems encountered by resolvers in the
form of 5 problem cases. Our tests also showed that despite
its complexity the solution performs well in a production
environment.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The introduction of DNSSEC creates new problems, such as
Internet zones becoming unreachable due to poorly configured
firewalls that block fragmented UDP packets. Although these
problems can easily be solved by changing the firewall rules
or by changing the behavior of DNS resolver software, our
research shows that DNS zone operators cannot rely on these
solutions always being implemented in practice. To avoid
becoming unreachable for clients behind faulty resolvers,
DNS zone operators have to take measures to prevent DNS
responses getting fragmented and blocked by firewalls.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first of its
kind that investigates these problems from the perspective of
the DNS zone operator. Data collected at the National Re-
search and Education Network in the Netherlands (SURFnet)
was analyzed, and results were validated using similar data
acquired at the University of Pennsylvania. Two solutions were
investigated and tested within the SURFnet network.
The first contribution of this paper is to what extent real-
world DNS resolvers experience problems caused by frag-
mented responses. We recorded more than 6 hours of DNS
traffic on the authoritative name servers of SURFnet; in total
we collected around 8.4 million DNS(SEC) messages. Our
analysis shows that 58% of all resolvers received a fragmented
response at some point in time. To identify which resolvers
experience problems, this paper identified five ways problem-
atic resolvers can behave. We found that about 10.5% of all
resolvers showed problematic behavior (see also Sec. II).
The second contribution of this paper, is how authoritative
name servers can avoid fragmentation of DNS responses for
problematic resolvers. Two solutions are presented. In the first
solution an authoritative name server will limit the size of all
its responses, which usually requires configuration changes
within a single authoritative name server for that zone (see
Sec. III). The second solution is more sophisticated and
requires special software that alters DNS queries, but only
for detected problematic resolvers. These altered queries result
in smaller responses and avoid response fragmentation for
problematic resolvers (see Sec. IV).
Finally the paper investigated how both solutions perform
in a real-world environment. We evaluated both solutions on
an authoritative name server of SURFnet. We concluded that
the benefits of the second solution, where only detected prob-
lematic resolvers are assisted, do not outweigh the simplicity
and real-world results of the first solution. Our proposal for
production environments would therefore be to implement the
first solution.
A. Future work
Further research is required to determine the advantages and
disadvantages of limiting the response size on more than one
authoritative name server for a zone (or even on all of them).
Secondly, we suspect that some problematic resolvers expe-
rience other issues besides receiving fragmented responses. A
firewall could block DNS messages with EDNS0, or a proxy
could limit UDP/DNS responses to 512 bytes [11]. Research
is required to detect and help these problematic resolvers.
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